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A New Model for Equitable and Efficient Resource 
Allocation to Schools: The Israeli Case 
 
This paper sets out a new budget allocation formula for schools, designed to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of educational achievement. In addition to needs-based elements, the 
suggested composite allocation formula includes an improvement component, whereby 
schools receive budgetary allocations based on a new incentive measure developed in this 
paper (Improvement in the Educational Achievement Distribution, or IEAD). The development 
of the budget allocation formula is demonstrated utilizing Israeli data. Large scale, nationwide 
data sets relating students’ academic achievement to student background variables, teacher 
profiles and school characteristics, were analyzed to identify appropriate needs-based 
formula components and to estimate their weights. The results are compared with the funding 
formulas currently used in Israel. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  I22 
  
Keywords:  school finance, formular funding, needs-based funding, 





Adrian Ziderman  
Economics Department 
Bar-Ilan University 
52900 Ramat Gan 
Israel 
E-mail: zidera@mail.biu.ac.il  
   1
1.  Introduction  
 
The method by which the state allocates the budget to the school system can serve as 
an important instrument for achieving desired improvements in levels of educational 
attainment, social equity and other social policy targets. In many school systems, the 
allocation of school budgets is done according to a needs-based funding formula. A needs-
based formula allocates budgets differentially to schools on the basis of the socioeconomic 
background of the student body; schools with students whose parents have low levels of 
education, who have a large number of siblings, and those living in rural areas will be in 
receipt of larger budgetary allocations.  
A needs-based school funding formula distributes education resources on a per-pupil basis 
according to the student’s background. The allocation formula used in England (a statutory 
requirement of the School Finance Regulations) provides an example of a needs-based 
formula. This formula assigns high weights to student background factors such as whether or 
not a pupil is entitled to a free meal at school (Adnett et al., 2002).  The formula used in 
Holland compensates for students of disadvantaged backgrounds; a larger compensation is 
allocated to non-Dutch students from a disadvantaged background than to Dutch students 
from a disadvantaged background (Ritzen et al., 1997; Canton & Webbink, 2002). A third 
example is that of the state of Florida, which allocates larger compensatory funds 
dichotomously, according to student background variables such as English as a Second 
Language (ESL) and eligibility for hot meals (Owens & Maiden, 1999). Similarly, the city of 
San Francisco’s resources are also distributed dichotomously, according to the specific needs 
of each student, such as special education, ESL, and socioeconomic status (Shambaugh, 
Chambers, & DeLancey, 2008)
 1. Israeli allocation at the primary school level also 
compensates students according to their background, but unlike the dichotomous   2
compensation allocation in use in San Francisco and Florida, the compensation is ‘diagonally’ 
allocated. That is to say, the extent of compensation is positively correlated with the depth of 
the need (Shoshani, 2001). 
Needs-based formula funding is generally regarded as an improvement on 
traditional, evenly-based school funding (e.g., input-based methods). School funding formulas 
can be instruments of educational policy, including policies aimed at change and reform. 
Because formulas can operate at the school level, and because they can be sensitive to a wide 
variety of cost factors and inputs (e.g., different categories of students), they can be effective 
instruments for reform, provided that they are properly deployed (Cohn & Geske 1990; Ross 
& Levacic, 1999; Levacic & Vignoles, 2002). 
Evenly-based funding formulas offer horizontal equity, but do not provide 
differential levels of resources based on differing needs. Resource allocation to Israeli high 
schools is of this kind
2. A funding formula designed to provide equality of inputs is regressive 
(i.e. it enlarges the achievement gap). This is so because evenly-based funding does not 
encourage vertical equity, considering that the needs of students vary according to their 
differing academic-achievement starting points; equality of inputs is actually regressive in 
that it allocates to schools the same resource amount, regardless of the average profile of 
academic starting points of the student body. 
     While needs-based funding provides additional resources to low-achieving schools 
with greater needs, there is also an expectation that these additional budgets will be used to 
raise academic achievements in these schools. The outcome of the debate on whether “money 
matters” – whether additional school resources lead to educational attainment improvement – 
has been largely resolved positively. But if there are no incentives for improvement, many 
low-achieving schools, in receipt of additional, differential funding, may continue to tread 
water rather than improve. Under needs-based budgeting, the continuation of additional   3
differential funding is not contingent upon progress in academic achievement. Thus, an 
allocation formula based solely upon needs-based features will lead to greater vertical equity, 
but might also preserve the current achievement distribution, given that incentives for 
progress are lacking. Alternatively, a school budget allocation formula based solely on 
incentives for progress (incorporating improvement components) might lead to a widening of 
the achievement gap, because such a formula ignores vertical equity. 
The literature does not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether equity 
and efficiency in educational finance are mutually exclusive or compatible. Nevertheless this 
paper, rather than treating equity and efficiency as dichotomous concepts, attempts to 
combine them using a distributional approach. Woessmann (2006) claims that, efficient 
education systems can create economic growth, and that equitable systems can create social 
cohesion. This paper suggests that both efficiency and equity can be enhanced by 
distributional output-oriented reforms, in which the state generally sets a regulatory 
framework that ensures accountability and funding. When school funding formulas are 
designed this way, education systems can advance efficiency and equity in parallel. 
The paper argues that both equity and efficiency may be achieved by developing a 
composite budget allocation formula incorporating both needs-based and improvement 
elements. With this outcome in mind, we develop (in Section 4) a new concept: the 
“Improvement in the Educational Achievement Distribution” (IEAD). The new formula 
addresses issues of both horizontal and vertical equity, as well as offering schools rewards for 
educational improvement.  
The formula is developed using Israeli data; this setting is thought to be an appropriate 
one because Israel is a diverse society encompassing ethnic minorities and immigrant groups. 
Moreover, the budgetary allocation system currently in use is neither efficient nor equitable, 
and therefore in need of reform.   4
Dissatisfaction with the allocation mechanism is evident in Israel (Central Bank of 
Israel, 2008; Kopp, 2008; Dovrat commission report, 2005). For instance, in response to 
litigation concerning the inequity of Israeli school finance, the Israeli Supreme Court recently 
instructed policy makers to transform the primary-school funding formula. Klinov (2008) 
reports on deficiencies at all three schooling levels in the funding formulas currently in use in 
Israel; however, empirical research on the issue of resource allocation to the Israeli school 
system is scarce.  
In addition to including the IEAD improvement-based component, the new formula 
developed in this paper includes a needs-based component that improves on those used in the 
differential formula currently employed for primary schools, based on the recommendations 
of the Shoshani Committee (2001). Furthermore, in accordance with the recommendations of 
the Dovrat Commission (2005), which have hitherto not been adopted, the proposed formula 
is to be applied uniformly to all schooling levels. Based on an analysis of extensive national 
data sets, then unavailable to these two committees, the proposed formula encompasses 
changes both in the components of the needs-based element and in their relative weights.    
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, some major features of the 
Israeli education system are described. The methodological Section 3 lays out the conceptual 
model, data sources and definitions of the variables used and regression analysis results. In 
Section 4, our new measure of educational progress – IEAD - is outlined; this constitutes the 
progress element in the new formula. Section 5 shows how the new allocation formula is 
designed and estimated on the basis of the regression analysis; the new composite formula is 
compared with those currently in use. Recent policy initiatives, not always positive, are 
discussed in the final Section 6. 
 
2     Current practice   5
2.1 The school system 
Population diversity 
 Throughout its sixty years of statehood, a key feature of Israel’s educational policy 
has been the achievement of high levels of, and equality in, educational attainment for its 
diverse population. Israel is a small country (about seven million residents), but its population 
is diverse. Seventy-six percent of its permanent residents are Jews, some of them immigrants 
from Western and Central Europe, North Africa and other Middle East countries, or their 
descendents. In the recent period 1990-2008, 1,035,200 new immigrants (fifteen percent of 
the population) came to Israel, 76,100 from Ethiopia and 799,590 from the former USSR. The 
rest of the population comprises ethnical minorities, mostly Arab residents (1,413,300)
3.   
Diversity is also found in the differing levels of economic material well-being. 
Income inequality in Israel is high and increasing. The Gini coefficient of income inequality 
(0.3878) has increased and now even exceeds that of the US.  In recent years, the average 
income of the highest decile has been increasing, while the average income of the lowest 
decile has declined. The average standard of living has increased, yet 24 percent of permanent 
residents are poor, as are 34 percent of Israeli children
4.  
 School structure
5     
The Israeli school system is primarily public and comprises primary, lower secondary 
(middle) and upper secondary (high) schools. Pluralism is a central feature of the system; 
alongside the system of state general education, there are separate systems of state-religious 
schools, education in Arabic for minority students and separate, independent ultra-orthodox 
religious schools. Approximately 77 percent of the total student population is enrolled in 
Hebrew education, and 23 percent in Arab education. Most of the official education system
6 
was restructured to be comprised of three levels: six years of primary education (grades 1 
through 6), three years of lower secondary schooling (grades 7 through 9), and three years of   6
upper secondary schooling (grades 10 through 12); the remaining official schools, which have 
not undergone the restructuring, comprise two levels only - primary schools (grades 1 through 
8) and secondary schools (grades 9 through 12).  
Israel’s official Hebrew education encompasses two divisions: state and state-
religious
7. Both these divisions belong to the state, but differ with regard to religious beliefs 
and practice. These differences were manifested by the establishment of separate schools, 
school curricula, and school personnel. The schools of the Ultra-Orthodox are separate from 
the main stream of state education, yet enjoy monetary support from the state.   
There are three post-primary level educational streams - regular-academic, 
technological-vocational and agricultural training. The comprehensive high school now is the 
most common type of schooling, accounting for some 70 percent of post-primary enrollments 
and including both academic and technological streams.  
            Achievement distribution 
 The Israeli student achievement distribution is characterized by a low level of 
achievement combined with a widening achievement gap, as evidenced in various 
international comparative examination studies. This is despite the declared policy goal of 
narrowing the achievement gap upwards. In Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 
(PIRLS, 2001), an international comparative study on literacy on the forth grade, Israeli 
students' level of achievement was ranked 23rd, out of 45 participating countries. The average 
score of Israeli students was 509 (compared with an overall average of 500). However, it 
should be noted that Arab and ultra-orthodox students were excluded from the sample; their 
inclusion would very likely have further lowered the Israeli average. In the Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA, 2000), an international comparative study on 
literacy among 15 years old students, Israeli students were ranked in the 30th place, out of 41 
countries.   7
In international comparative examinations on Mathematics and Science, Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS, 1999), the Israeli students’ level of 
achievement is lower than average. The Israeli students' level of achievement in Mathematics 
was ranked 28th, out of 38 countries participating in the test. Only five percent of Israeli 
students were “excellent” in Mathematics and only seven percent in Science. Again, only 
Jewish students were examined; if other minorities had been included, it is likely that the 
Israeli achievement level would have been lower. 
According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2006), not all youth in the 
relevant age group are students – only some 80 percent of them attend school. Furthermore, 
only less than 50 percent of this age group (including both students and non-students) 
performed well enough on the matriculation exams to entitle them to a matriculation diploma; 
of these, only forty percent gained a diploma that is sufficient for acceptance to Israeli 
universities.  
The distribution of educational achievement in Israel is also characterized by wide 
gaps. Tsur and Zussman (2008) examined the differences between the matriculation 
examinations achievement of Israeli students from various socioeconomic backgrounds and 
found widening gaps in indicators of excellence between the achievement of students from 
weak socioeconomic backgrounds and those from strong backgrounds. Compared to OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, Israeli students 
exhibit the widest achievement gap. Amongst industrialized countries, the scholastic 
achievements level of Israeli students is among the lowest and the educational gaps among 
Israeli students are the widest. Furthermore, the achievements of the higher decile of Israeli 
students are below those of similar students in all of the industrialized countries (Ben-David, 
2003; Dovrat, 2005; Dahan & Ben-Basat; 2004, Dahan, al el, 2002; Mevarech & Liberman, 
2004). The achievement gap is related to ethnicity, socio-economic level, country of origin,   8
new immigrant status, and residence area, i.e. periphery versus the centre (Dahan et al., 2002; 
BenDavid-Hadar, 2008). 
Given this discouraging Israeli student achievement distribution, it is thought that a 
reshaped school resource allocation system may serve a key corrective role in narrowing the 
achievement gap and boosting the level of achievement, in line with policy makers’ goals. 
2.2  Current funding formula  
This section explains why it is necessary to develop a new needs-based element in the 
school funding formula. Differing budget allocation formulas are applied at the various 
schooling levels within the state system: an evenly-based allocation formula for high schools, 
separate needs-based formulas (with five elements) for Hebrew and for Arab education at the 
middle school level, and a needs-based formula (with seven elements) at the primary school 
level (see Table 1). The overall primary and middle school budget allocation comprises two 
components; the major component, the fixed budget, accounts for some 87 percent of the total 
budget allocation, while the remaining 13 percent constitute the compensating, needs-based 
budget component.  
The primary school budget allocation is the product of the number of students and the 
average differential (student) index for the school (Shoshani Committee, 2001); resources are 
allocated to schools in terms of instructional hours rather than in monetary terms. The 
differential index is a per-student index calculated according to a needs-based formula (i.e., a 
larger budget is allocated to needy students according to the depth of their needs), with an 
added “national priority” element (i.e., larger budget is allocated to students living in areas 
that were defined as 'national priority' areas, such as those near Israel’s borders). A common 
differential index is used for both Hebrew and Arab education. The elements and relative 
weights, as set out in Table 1, Column 1, are as follows: mother's level of education (15%), 
father's level of education (15%), number of siblings (10%), new immigrant status (20%),   9
immigrant from developing countries status (10%), national priority status (20%), and 
periphery location status, i.e., schools located in a distance from the nearest of the three 
largest cities in Israel (10%). Most of the weights were derived from regression analyses 
examining the correlates between students' background characteristics and students' 
achievement.    10
 
Table 1: Current and proposed needs-based formula elements and weights 
 



































     Mother's education level  15 -- --  --  23 
     Father's education level  15 25 25  --  13 
     Number of siblings   10 12.5 15 --  6 
     New immigrant status   20 -- 15  --  8 
     New immigrants from           
developing countries status 
10 -- --  --  8 
     Residence:  Periphery  











     School in mixed cities  -- 12.5 -- --  -- 
National priority status   20 -- --  --  -- 
     Ethnicity  -- -- --  --  19 
     Income  -- 25  25  --  -- 
`  
 
At the middle school level, a two-stage allocation mechanism is in place (Nesher, 
1996). First, the total middle school budget is divided between the two ethnic groups, 
according to the total number of students in each group. As noted above, some thirteen 
percent of the basic standard budget is set aside for compensatory budget allocation; the 
remainder comprises the fixed budget allocation. The percentage of schools entitled to receive 
a differential budget is determined by the Ministry of Education (in 2006, 75% of Jewish 
schools and all non-Jewish schools were entitled to receive differential budgets). The 
compensating budget is differentially allocated to each eligible school at the second stage, 
after a deduction of ten percent accruing to the municipal authorities. Each eligible school 
within its respective ethnic group receives a relative, differential budget; separate differential   11
formulas are employed for each ethnic group. This two-step allocation mechanism has the 
undesirable effect of allocating lower budgets to the neediest (minority) student groups.  
The elements of the differential index for Jewish and Minority middle schools are set 
out in Table 1, Column 2. The elements of the formula for Jewish students are: percent of 
low-income families (25%); percent of fathers with low-level education (25%); percent of 
large families (15%); percent of new immigrants (15%); and a periphery index based on the 
distance from the nearest of the three largest cities (20%). The elements of the differential 
index for Arab students are: percent of low income families (25%); percent of fathers with 
low-level education (25%); percent of large families (12.5%); periphery element (25%), in 
this case referring to families from unrecognized localities (12.5%) and  schools in small 
residences (12.5%); and schools in mixed cities
8 (12.5%), (Nesher, 1996).  
Overall, the current system of school budgeting in Israel is in need of revision. High 
schools are budgeted on an even-basis system, which provides horizontal but not vertical 
equity, and there are no incentives for improvement in performance. Needs-based budgeting 
is in place for primary and middle schools, but the formulas employed are deficient, both in 
terms of the elements used in the formula and the weights assigned to them; this will be 
demonstrated in Section 5). For these schools as well, progress incentives are lacking. The 
cost, in terms of the overall quality of the educational system, is not small. Comparative 
international evidence attests to a relative decline in Israeli schools’ educational attainment 
and Israeli students display relatively low achievements in international examinations, as 
described in section 2.1. Together with the widening of the achievement gap (Ben-David, 
2000), this portends ill for Israel’s long-term economic and social progress. The new 
composite funding formula developed in this paper may go some way towards a reversal of 
these trends.  
   12
3    Methodology 
This section describes the methodology used in the design of an improved allocation 
formula, improved both in terms of better addressing school needs and of promoting progress 
in student academic achievement. The conceptual model underlying the statistical analysis is 
presented; this is followed by an account of the data sources and the variables used in the 
statistical analysis.  
      3.1 Conceptual model 
The conceptual model, shown in Figure 1, presents two kinds of relationships between 
the variables. The first is the direct relationships between student performance and various 
background features. This is shown by the solid-line arrows in Figure 1. This provides a direct 
measure of the contribution of each explanatory variable to variation in academic 
achievements. The beta coefficients for the student background variables are used to identify 
the needs-based components and size of weights to be included in the new funding formula, 
as will be explained in Section 5; they will also indicate which of the components used in the 
current formula need to be excluded, replaced or assigned different weights. Teacher profiles 
and school characteristics are employed as control variables because they are most likely to 






























Figure 1: The conceptual model 
OLS regression analysis is employed, a method widely used in the literature to 
measure the relationships between student performance and student background 
characteristics (Jenkins, Levacic, & Vignoles ,2006; Gould, Lavy,  & Paserman, 2004; 
Carnoy, Gove, & Marshall,  2007). The dotted arrow represents a second kind of relationship, 
indicating a reward for academic improvement (to be explained in Section 4). 













Performance   14
 Extensive data sets were obtained by special request from the records of the Israeli 
Ministry of Education, comprising three levels of schooling (i.e. primary, middle, and high 
school). However, only high school data were available on the student (individual) level. The 
data for the other two levels of schooling (primary and middle schools) were available only at 
the school level. Therefore, the regression results for these levels are not reported here, 
although they were taken into account in formulating the policy suggestions included in this 
paper; these results are available on request.  
High school data  
The data set contains nation-wide matriculation examination scores
9, at the student 
level, for the year 2001. The matriculation examinations in Israel are centralized. The entire 
process is governed by the Ministry of Education. The exams on all compulsory subjects (see 
below) and most optional subjects are designed and written by the Ministry, thereby creating 
a standard measure of the students' knowledge throughout the country. All students who are 
Israeli citizens take one or more of the nation-wide matriculation examinations.  
The data relate to about 84,000 students (25% are minority students), in some 1,100 
high schools. Included in the data base are all the students' scores at the final examinations for 
each subject in which students were tested, and the level of the subject material at which they 
were examined. The second part of the data set contains information on student background 
features such as the level of the mother’s and the father’s education, ethnicity, origin of birth, 
number of siblings and residence. The data also include teacher profiles (seniority and 
education level) and school characteristics such as school size and type of supervision (state 
or state-religious).  
3.3    Variables 
Two types of variables were defined: dependent (endogenous) variables, and 
independent (exogenous) variables.   15
Dependent (endogenous) variables 
The dependent variables relate to student performance. Two main types of high school 
performance data are used, one relating to performance level and the other to performance 
quality. The level of performance is represented by the Mathematics matriculation score, 
which was calculated with respect to the differing levels of Mathematics (i.e. number of study 
units, or “credit points”) in which individual students were examined. This is thought to be an 
improvement on the traditional measure of performance in terms of the overall matriculation 
(Bagrut) mean score. It was chosen as more representative of the level of high school 
achievement, because it is an obligatory subject in the matriculation examinations and the 
examinations are standard for all students; this facilitates student comparisons.  
A quality measure was introduced because of wide variations amongst students in the 
scope of their matriculation diploma. Individual diplomas vary because of a differing number 
of subjects taken and differing study levels within some subjects. Thus a diploma may relate 
to the minimum required credit points (twenty one) or to a more comprehensive study plan of 
up to fifty credit points. Quality of performance is defined as the summation of the products 
of every subject score by the number of points in each subject. This is thought to more 
reliable than the overall average matriculation score, because it reflects the variation in 
performance. For example, a student would be considered an excellent student if he or she 
scores 100 on the variable “overall matriculation mean score”. However, this score of 100 
may correspond to a wide range of scores on the variable “quality”, from the lowest value of 
2100 (100 * 21 credit points, the required minimum) to the highest value of 5000 (100 * 50 
credit points), representing a different interpretation of “excellence”.  
Independent (exogenous) variables 
Four sets of independent variables were defined. Three vectors of need-based 
variables were used in the regression analysis: student background (to estimate the formula   16
weights) and teacher profiles and school characteristics (as controls). A fourth measure of 
academic progress, the IEAD improvement variable, was defined but not employed in the 
regression analysis, as explained subsequently. 
          The student background category consists of three types of variables. First, some 
student variables were defined directly, relating to gender, origin of birth, immigration year, 
and ethnicity
10. Second, the student socio-economic status variable (SES) was defined 
indirectly, in the absence of Ministry of Education information on student SES. The SES 
measure used is based on student residence location, using an SES index developed by the 
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2006). This index assigns to each local authority a 
number ranging from one to ten, where a lower number indicates lower average SES. Third, 
parental characteristics were defined, relating to fathers’ and mothers’ education level and to 
fathers’ and mothers’ origin of birth.  
         The teacher profile variables (used as controls) comprise information on teacher's 
education (which is defined as a continuous variable, with the doctorate receiving the highest 
ranking) and seniority, defined by number of years in the teaching profession.   
          School characteristic control variables were included: school size, average school SES 
level, supervision (state, state-religious), and school type (the new school structure consists of 
three schooling levels while the old structure comprises only primary and secondary schools).    17
 


































+ Other control variables were also used  
           
Dependent variables  Independent variables 
 
Primary schools: Fifth grade 
achievement in final examinations 
(Meitsav) 
 
Middle schools: Eighth grade 
achievement in final examinations 
(Meitsav) 
 
High schools:  performance level 
and quality in the matriculation 
examination (Bagrut)  
 
 
Student background variables: 
Gender 
 (dummy variable - value 0 assigned to 
male students and value 1 to female 
students. 
      student’s origin of birth  
      year of immigration 
 ethnicity  
    (dummy variable - value 1 assigned to 
Jewish students and value 0 otherwise)  
      SES (residence) 
      number of siblings  
      father's education level 
      mother's education  level 
      father's origin of birth  
      mother's origin of birth  
 
Controls: 
      
      Teacher  profiles:  
           education  
           seniority 
  
      School characteristics+:  
          school size:  
               number of students 
               number of teachers  
               number of classes 
          student-teacher ratio  
          average number of students per class 
          school compensating decile  
               (calculated by school average SES) 
     school supervision   
         (dummy variable - value 0 to state         
school  and the value 1 to state religious)     
     school type  
         (dummy variable - value 0 to eight 
           grades at a post primary school and 1 to 
           eight grades at a primary school) 
     school’s legal status 
(dummy variable - value 0 assigned to 
recognized but not official schools and 
value 1 to official schools) 
   18
Table 2 lists the variables used in the regression analysis; the relationships amongst these 
variables are indicated in Figure 1. The analysis of high schools is at the student level.           
          Since suitable data for measuring the improvement component (IEAD) is yet 
unavailable in Israel (though such information is currently in preparation), this component 
was not included as a variable in the regression analyses reported below. In the absence of a 
direct estimate of the size of this variable, a proxy measure for this formula component was 
used, based on the results of external, value-added research. When suitable Israeli data for 
the direct measurement of IEAD becomes available in the near future, the size of this 
formula element will be estimated directly from an extended regression model, based on a 
measure of school value-added in Israel. The IEAD concept is explained in detail in the 
following Section 4; meanwhile, we present the results of the regression analysis. 
             3.4 Regression Results 
The results of regression analyses measuring the direct relationship between student 
performance and student background variables are now presented. An explanation of how the 
regression beta coefficients for the student background variables are translated into new 
formula elements and weights is given in Section 5.   
In addition to regressions for the total sample, separate regressions by ethnicity 
were executed (Jewish versus Arab student performance), while others entailed separate 
analyses for each ethnic sub-group (Arabs, Druze, Bedouin). Separate regressions were also 
run including various interaction effects. Additional regressions were executed for other 
schooling levels. While we report only the findings of the total sample regressions on the high 
school level, including parental education interaction effects, some key results from other 
regression runs are referred to in the following discussion, as necessary. Full results from 
these other regression runs are available from the authors, on request.    19
Results for the student background variables are reported in Table 3; results for the 
controls are not reported. Amongst the student background variables, parental education and 
ethnicity make the greatest contribution to explaining the variations in student achievement.  
 




Explanatory variables+  Level 
 (Mathematics score) 
Quality 
     Gender  Ns  -0.07** 
     Number of years in Israel (for new 
immigrants)  0.07** 0.03** 
     Ethnicity  0.04**  0.07** 
     Residence (SES)  0.04**  Ns 
     Number of siblings   -0.04**  -0.04** 
     Parents' education interaction  0.23**  0.24** 
     Mother’s education level  0.06**  0.05** 
     Father's origin of birth  0.04** Israel  Ns 
R
2  0.14 0.13 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Ns  Variable is not significant  
+ Non-significant variables in these regressions are not reported in the table. These variables include the father’s 
level of education and the student’s origin of birth. 
 
 
The effect of the parental education interaction variable is large (quality measure of 
performance β=0.24** and achievement level of performance β=0.23**). The mother’s 
education (β=0.05** and β=0.06**) appears to be more important than the father’s education, 
which was not found to be significant in the model including the interaction effect (and is 
therefore not reported). However, the father’s education coefficient is significant in the same 
model with no interaction effect (β=0.1**), though this effect is still smaller than that of the 
mother’s education (β=0.2**); the opposite result was found for minorities
11.    20
Ethnicity also contributes to explaining achievement variation, though the reported 
beta coefficients for ethnicity on the high school level are rather weak (β= 0.04** and 0.07**, 
respectively for the level and quality measures of performance).  
The contribution of the remaining student background variables to explaining 
achievement variation is low. The number of siblings variable is negatively related to 
achievements (β=-0.04**). Residence SES also explains variation in student achievement 
(β=0.04**). New immigrant achievements are related positively to the length of time spent in 
Israel (β=0.03** and β=0.07**).  
 
4.  Rewarding educational progress and the IEAD concept 
  4.1 The need to incorporate an improvement component 
 The central argument of this paper is that school budget allocation formulas should 
include an incentive element that encourages schools to improve the educational attainment of 
their students.  We argue that, to this end, the formula should be a composite of two major 
components: a needs-based component and an improvement component. The needs-based 
component is a differential budget that allocates resources according to students' differing 
academic-achievement starting points in a way that sustains vertical equity. A formula based 
solely on the principle of budgeting according to student starting points (determined by 
student background characteristics) is inefficient, since it fails to encourage schools to move 
towards improved student attainment. Thus schools with low-achieving students receive 
larger budgets regardless of the progress made.  
The improvement component is an incentive mechanism designed to achieve the 
improvement of the educational achievement distribution. How should progress in student 
educational attainment be defined, in terms of an improvement component in the budget   21
allocation formula? For this purpose, we introduce a new concept – Improvement in 
Educational Achievement Distribution (IEAD).  
The design of the incentive component proposed in this paper is innovative, as it 
comprises movement towards enhanced academic achievement, while controlling for the size 
of the educational achievement gap. Thus IEAD has two elements, relating to raising the level 
of educational attainment and narrowing the educational achievement gap. Both elements are 
important. An incentive component that is designed only to increase the level of performance 
(i.e. by allocating larger budgets to schools that raised the level of educational performance) 
might encourage a widening of the achievement gap, leading to enlargement of the income 
gap and to wider segregation of society. An incentive component designed solely to narrow 
the achievement gap, may narrow it downwards by lowering the level of achievement in order 
to narrow the achievement gap. This would mean that programs of excellence would not 
receive appropriate funding. Thus, the proposed IEAD incentive mechanism is designed to 
meet the dual objectives of encouraging increased levels of academic performance and of 
narrowing the educational achievement gap. As explained, the improvement features would 
lead toward achieving the combined goals of higher achievement and narrow achievement 
gaps. An additional budget is allocated to those schools that have succeeded in registering an 
improvement in the educational achievement distribution. 
Hanushek (1996) argues that, in order to improve U.S. Schools, it is essential for 
improved performance incentives to be introduced in schools. Hanushek elaborates that 
incentives based upon student outcomes hold the largest hope for improving schools. He 
concludes that improvement is much more likely if policies are built on what students actually 
accomplish and if good performance by students gets rewarded. Springer and Winters (2009) 
review recent performance-related compensation reforms in U.S. states and districts such as   22
Denver, New York City, Dallas, and Houston. These pay-for-performance programs are still 
being implemented or evaluated.  
Furthermore, recent studies report on the positive impact of pay-for-performance 
programs. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) and Lavy (2002) found that student and 
teacher incentive programs in India and Israel improved student outcomes. Moreover, 
empirical studies argue for the efficacy of including performance incentives and rewards in 
the school funding formula. Lavy (2002) showed that performance incentives improved the 
achievements of low-performing students in Israeli high schools, more so than incentives 
provided for students with higher academic starting points. A study by Carnoy and McEwan 
(2000), based on data from Chile, is supportive of these findings; they also show that 
incentives are less beneficial for middle and upper class students. Angrist et al. (2007) 
extended Lavy's methodology to college students in Toronto, Canada, and found that 
incentives provided to schools with low-achieving students (i.e. with low starting points) 
improved performance levels.  
4.2 The Educational Improvement Curve 
An improvement that merits additional budgets in a school’s educational achievement 
distribution (IEAD) is defined differentially, according to the school’s starting point, i.e. its 
current educational achievement distribution (EAD). Based on Israeli high school 
examination data from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS), 
Mevarech and Liberman (2004) have argued that a school’s level of achievement and its 
achievement gap are negatively correlated. If this were so for all schools, then allocating 
resources in a way that boosts student achievement would lead also to a narrowing of the 
achievement gap. But this is not the case for all schools; a negative relationship does not hold 
for low-achieving students (BenDavid-Hadar, 2008). Therefore, allocating resources to these 
schools in a way that raises student achievement would widen the achievement gap.    23
 













Figure 2: Education Improvement Curve: achievement level versus achievement 
gap 
 
Consider three examples of schools, which we refer to as school types A, B and C, as 
shown in Figure 2. School A has an educational achievement distribution that is characterized 
by a low level of academic achievement and a narrow achievement gap, and is located at the 
left polar of the IEAD curve (Figure 2). School C has a desirable educational achievement 
distribution, combining a high level of achievement and a narrow achievement gap, and is 
located at the left polar of the curve. School B displays an achievement distribution 
characterized by average levels of achievement and a wide achievement gap, and is located at 
the extreme point between these two polar. The three points A, B and C lie on the Education 
Improvement Curve, which traces out a desired improvement path for schools progressing 
over time
12.  Incentives should be offered to encourage movement from left to right along the 
curve. C is the preferred school type, in which achievements are high and the education 
attainment gap is low.  
An improvement in terms of the IEAD component, for which schools are rewarded 
with additional budgets, is defined differently for the above three school types. For school 
Achievement level 
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type A on the left side of the curve (a low-achieving school), a movement from point A to A* 
is defined as an IEAD. That is, even though the raising of the achievement level of school 
type A has resulted in an enlarged achievement gap, the move to A* is regarded as an 
improvement, because the school is moving in the direction of school type C.  However, a 
move from point A to point A** (where the achievement level has decreased and the 
achievement gap widened) would not be rewarded with additional funding, because there has 
not been an improvement in its achievement distribution. The mathematical formulation of 
IEAD is presented in the Appendix. 
For school types B and C, at the center and the right side of the curve, IEAD is 
defined as movements from point B to B* or from point C to C*, respectively. That is, if 
either of the school types B or C has managed to elevate its level of achievement and to 
narrow its overall achievement gap, it should receive a larger budget. However, a move from 
point B to point B**, where the achievement gap is narrower while the level of achievement 
is lower, would not be rewarded with additional resources.  
A crucial issue is the practicality of this approach in locating point B, the turning point 
on the curve, in order to identify low-achieving schools for which IEAD is defined (an 
increase in the achievement level combined with a widening of the achievement gap). Using 
domestic and international data, such as Israeli matriculation examination data cross-
sectioned by different groups within Israel and the Program for International Students 
Achievement (PISA, 2006) data for different countries, it has been shown that this point 
occurs at the middle range of the variable discussed (BenDavid-Hadar, 2008).
13  
 
5 Towards a new, unified formula 
           5.1 Moving from regression coefficients to formula weights    25
 As noted, there are four budgetary allocation methods in place at present in Israel: 
evenly-based allocation for high schools, separate needs-based formulas at middle schools for 
the two ethnic groups (relating to Hebrew and Arab education), and a needs-based formula at 
the primary school level. A basic decision was made in this study to develop a single, unified 
formula relating to all three levels of schooling and to both ethnic groups. While a regime of 
separate formulas (by school level, minority or special interest group) has the advantage of 
targeting the various formulas to the particular needs of the group concerned, it carries serious 
risks. Once the door for multiple formulas is opened, minority and special interest groups may 
exert pressure to receive their own tailored formulas, with elements and weights designed to 
advance their own narrow interests. The decision to develop a single, unified formula is in 
line with the recommendation of the Dovrat commission to extend the primary school formula 
to the other schooling levels, with minor changes. 
We now proceed, in three stages, to derive the unified formula weights from the 
regression beta coefficients. The first stage is to average the variables’ contributions to 
predicting educational performance (beta coefficients reported in Table 3), to obtain 
“preliminary” formula weights; these are reported in Column 1, Table 4. This procedure is 
justified since the same regression model was used for the two regressions and the resulting 
beta coefficients are very similar in the two cases. The second stage is to derive “adjusted” 
formula weights, taking into account policy considerations and additional information on the 
relative importance of these student background factors (Column 2, Table 4). In the third 
stage, adjusted weights are normalized to obtain relative weights for the formula. Thus, 
weight (w) for formula element i was computed as follows: 
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 where  i b is the adjusted contribution for variable i, 
     n is the number of variables, and 
     W is the total of needs-based weights in the formula. 
  
5.2 The new formula  
The new budget allocation formula, based on the above-mentioned regression 
analyses, is presented in Table 4. In Column 2, the adjusted contributions for each student 
background variable are shown; the sum of these estimated weights is 0.51. Column 3 
presents these needs-based weights, using equation (1), but normalized to 80; the IEAD 
element is accorded a weight of 20 – see below. The rest of this section provides an 
explanation of how the new formula elements were defined, with respect to the regression 
results.  
 




















weights   
Needs- based 
Parental education:    
     Mother's education level 









Number of siblings   0.04  4 
 
6 
New immigrant status   0.05  5 
 
8 
New immigrants from           




Residence: SES             0.02  2  3   27
Ethnicity 0.06  12 
 
19 
Total   0.46  51  80 
 
Improvement 
IEAD  -- -- 
  20 
Total  -- --  100 
`  
 
From the regression analysis reported above, it is evident that parental education, 
especially mother's education, is the most important variable in explaining the variance in 
student achievement. Based on these results, as well as on other regressions executed without 
interaction effects and separate regressions by ethnic group, we conclude that the parental 
education interaction is an important variable in explaining student performance; its overall 
estimated contribution effect is 23 (Table 4, Column 2). This is normalized to give a formula 
weight of 36 (Column 3). However, mother’s education has a larger effect in explaining 
student performance than father’s education; its effect is about twice that of the father’s 
education.
14 Thus, the combined parental education weight is split, to give a formula weight of 
23 for mother’s education and 13 for father’s education.  
  Based on the measured beta coefficient (0.04**, Table 3), the measured 
contribution for number of siblings is 0.04 (Table 4, Column 1); its adjusted weight is 4 
(Column 2) and the normalized weight is 6 (Column 3). 
  The measured beta coefficients for new immigrants are 0.07** and 0.03**, as 
shown in Table 3, from which an averaged contribution of 0.05 is derived (Table 4, Column 
1), giving an adjusted formula weight of 5 and a normalized weight of 8. The measured beta 
coefficient of the residence SES is 0.04** (for the performance level variable) and not 
significant, close to zero (for the quality of performance variable), as shown in Table 3. These   28
results lead to an averaged contribution of 0.02 (Table 4, Column 1), an adjusted formula 
weight of 2 and a normalized weight of 3.  
Ethnicity plays an important role in explaining achievement gaps in Israel (BenDavid-
Hadar, 2008) and is included prominently in the new formula. We adjust the beta coefficient 
of 0.06 (Table 4, Column 1) upwards, to retain adequate compensation for students from 
ethnic minorities. The beta coefficient for ethnic group does not reflect adequately the role of 
this variable in accounting for student performance, given the wide range in the estimated 
contribution effects (i.e. a stronger effect at the primary school and middle school levels and a 
much weaker effect at the high school level). The relatively low beta coefficients at the high 
school level (0.04**, 0.07**) compare with much higher beta coefficients from aggregated 
school level regressions on the middle school and primary school levels (0.36** and 0.45**, 
respectively)
15. Since it is our intention to create a uniform formula for all schooling levels, 
we saw it fit not to directly “translate” the beta coefficient derived from the high-school level 
regressions, but rather to take into account the impact of ethnicity at the other schooling 
levels, assigning to ethnicity a higher adjusted weight of 12, normalized to 19. 
Finally, the weight for new immigrant from developing countries status variable was 
adjusted. Following the practice in the current formula for primary schools, an additional 
weight is accorded to the new immigrant category, for new immigrants from developing 
countries. This compensates schools in which many new immigrant students from developing 
countries are enrolled, with low educational performance starting points. The performance of 
students of Ethiopian origin, the most recently arrived new immigrant group, are lower than 
that of other students (t= 2.53**, df=394, in Hebrew middle schools). Similar results are 
found for students whose parents were born in Ethiopia (t=2.3**, df =394, based on the 
authors’ calculations, available on request). An additional element, with a weight of 5 (Table   29
4, Column 2) is given for new immigrants from developing countries, normalized to a weight 
of 8. 
In addition to these needs-based weights, the new budget formula should include the 
incentive element, the IEAD, which is missing in the current formula. According to this 
element, a school's budget will be enlarged if the school manages to achieve IEAD. Including 
an IEAD element in the proposed formula supports a central objective of the schooling 
process, which is to achieve progress by improving students’ starting points. A weight of 20 is 
assigned to the IEAD element (Table 4, Column 3). This is based on the results of school 
improvement, researched by Hayes and Taylor (1996) using Dallas school data. It was found 
that the schools' value-added beta coefficient explains 10 percent of the total explained 
variance in performance. However, the IEAD was assigned a larger weight of 20, representing 
a reward for –and an incentive to– academic improvement. In future work, the IEAD weight 
will be measured directly, by using value-added models on longitudinal Israeli data that are 
not currently unavailable, but will be forthcoming in the near future. The direct measure of 
schools’ value-added and its weight in explaining variance in achievement may indicate the 
need to assign an even larger weight to IEAD.  
5.3 Comparing proposed and current formulas 
 Table I facilitates a comparison of the proposed need-based elements and weights 
with those currently in use in the primary and middle school formulas; our proposed new 
formula weights are listed in Column 3.
16 First, we may compare parental education: the 
weights accorded to parents’ education in the current differential indexes for primary and 
secondary schools are inappropriate. For primary schools, both parents are accorded the same 
weight (15); but our regression analyses have shown that mother’s education is the more 
important variable in explaining student achievement variance. Thus the current weight 
assigned to mother’s education is too low and that of father’s education is too high. Mother's   30
education is not even included in the middle school formula, in which the weight assigned to 
father's education is 25, far larger than its true effect on achievement. 
The weights assigned to the number of siblings in the needs-based elements of the 
current formulas are clearly too high. The current weights assigned to number of siblings at 
the primary school and middle school levels range between 10 and 15, while the beta 
coefficient for this variable in our regression analysis merits a weight of no more than 5. 
The current formulas are inefficient in assigning total new immigrant status a weight 
as high as 30 for primary schools and only 15 for middle schools, even though middle schools 
suffer from a wider achievement gap than do primary schools (Lavy, 2003).  
The proposed element weight for compensating schools with students from low SES 
residence locations (and low achievement starting points) is lower than in the current primary 
and middle school formulas. The periphery element in the current formula, a proxy for SES 
level, is defined in terms of geographical distance from large cities. But this definition is not 
very appropriate as an SES measure, because some of the most remote residences enjoy a 
high SES, whereas some large cities (such as Jerusalem) suffer from a low SES. Our measure 
of SES level is more accurate, accounting for the weight differences in the current and 
proposed formulas.   
The national priority status element in the current primary school budgeting formula is 
deemed inappropriate in a needs-based formula and, indeed, is currently being dropped (see 
discussion in Section 6). Moreover, this component was not found to be a significant factor in 
explaining the achievement gap (BenDavid-Hadar, 2008). An additional instance of the 
inefficiency of the current formulas is the absence of an ethnicity element. The parental 
income element in the middle school formula is problematic because parental income and 
parental education are highly correlated.   31
 
6  Recent initiatives 
In the last few years, school funding reform has come to the fore in public debate. 
While, on the whole, the initial steps in this process were largely positive, more recent 
initiatives have been highly regressive and may lead to an increase in horizontal and vertical 
inequities and a widening of the achievement gap.  
The Dovrat Commission (2005), appointed to examine the state of schooling in Israel 
and all its ramifications, recommended the extension of the primary schools’ needs-based 
formula (Shoshani’s differential index) to middle schools and high schools. This entailed 
applying to the two higher levels of schooling the equitable principal used in primary school 
budget allocation (where the school budget is the product of the number of students times the 
differential index of each student). This recommendation was accompanied by several 
proposed changes in the formula elements (the omission of the national priority status element 
and the insertion of an income per capita element), by a small change in the element weights 
(mother’s education enlarged to 20%, father’s education reduced to 10%), and the allocation 
of the school budget in monetary terms rather than in hours. Due to vested interest opposition, 
the overall recommendations of the commission, including those relating to school funding, 
were not implemented. Subsequently, an Israeli Supreme Court decision in 2006 stated that 
the national priority status element discriminated against minority students. This ruling led to 
the removal of this element from the primary school funding formula. 
   With the national priority status element jettisoned from the primary school 
allocation formula, some adjustment to the Shoshani Index was necessary. In practice, it was 
replaced in 2007 by a virtually new formula, the "Strauss Index", which encompassed changes 
in both the formula elements and their weights. It comprises four elements, as follows:   32
parental education, 40%; parental income, 20%; periphery, 20%; continent of birth of the 
student or parents, 20%. All four elements are problematic. 
The increase in the weights assigned to parental education (from 30 to 40 points) and 
to the periphery element (10 to 20 points) is not based on empirical evidence. Moreover, the 
parental education element was unified; this goes against the Dovrat recommendations and 
our own empirical findings, which indicate that the mother’s education level should be 
accorded a separate, larger formula weight.  
It has been noted that the current definition of periphery does not reflect SES 
differences very accurately. Moreover, while the inclusion of the parental income element 
will result in larger budget allocations to minority student schools, it constitutes a form of 
double counting as parental education and income are highly correlated. Finally, the continent 
of birth element discriminates against endogenous ethnic minority groups.  
These new formula weights were assigned on an ad hoc basis; this represents a major 
departure from the approach advocated in this paper, that the allocation formula should be 
based on research that mainly focuses on the measured relationships between student 
performance and various explanatory variables and not on arbitrary decisions.  
Even more damaging, however, is the decision to accompany the Strauss Index with a 
comprehensive reform of the primary school allocation mechanism overall, starting in 2008. 
This mechanism works as follows: 95 percent of the total budget is to be allocated to primary 
schools, on an even basis, regardless of their academic attainment starting point and needs 
(compared with the present allocation of 87 percent). The remaining budget (five percent) will 
be allocated according to the Strauss needs-based formula. This reform represents a highly 
retrograde step and a departure from the equitable principle of the Shoshani Index, also 
advocated by the Dovrat Commission, according to which a sizeable part of the school budget 
is the product of the number of students by the average differential (student) index for the   33
school. This overall change essentially marginalizes any equitable effects of the Strauss 
Index, as five percent of the total allocation is unlikely to make a sizable indent on the large 
achievement gap (compared with the present thirteen percent). Moreover, according to this 
two-stage allocation, low-achieving schools will receive even lower budgetary allocations 
than at present and an enlargement of the achievement gap is expected to follow.  
Thus school funding in Israel has now taken a new direction, emphasizing “adequate” 
(equal) funding for schools based on student numbers rather than needs-based funding. This, 
plus the absence of an improvement component in the funding formula, is likely to lead to 
greater vertical and horizontal disparities and to an unfortunate widening of the achievement 
gap, an outcome that is the very opposite of declared policy objectives and societal needs. 
    34
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The mathematical formulation of IEAD for school type A is as follows: 
IEAD (A)=  
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   are the j- th school achievement gap at time t and t-1.  
The mathematical formulation of IEAD for school type B or C is as follows: 
IEAD (B,C)=  
 























        






                                                  
1     These cases resemble Israel's societal diversity and also include sizeable ethnic minorities. 
2      Hawaii constitutes another example of a full state funding program that satisfies the principle of 
horizontal equity, since each district is not permitted to spend less than the level set by state, nor to exceed it 
(Odden and Picus, 2000). 
3    Data from Israel Central Bureau of  Statistics, November 2009 http://www.cbs.gov.il/ 
4    Data from the 2006 Israeli Poverty Report. http://www.btl.gov.il  
5    For more details, see the website http://cms.education.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/0D4A1917-8256-42D4-
A55A-AFAD4D2A3A3B/6934/Section_A.pdf 
6    Official education: official educational institutions are owned by the state and/or by the local 
authorities and are listed in the Official Gazette as official schools. 
7    The total budget for primary schools providing Hebrew education is allocated as follows: 60% for 
state-general schools, 20% for state-religious schools and 20% for other religious schools. The secondary 
education budget is allocated as follows: 70% state-general schools, 20% for state-religious school, and 10% for 
other religious schools.  
8    Mixed cities are those in which Jewish and non-Jewish populations live together. 
9    Matriculation examinations are the final tests prior to receiving a high-school diploma (Bagrut 
diploma) in Israel. To be eligible for a diploma, a student must gain a minimum of 21 units in different subjects 
and a pass grade (55 percent or more) in the obligatory subjects (such as Mathematics and English). 
10    Ethnicity was also analyzed in various regression runs, in terms of separate sub-categories for various 
minority groups (Arab students, Druze students, and Bedouin students); in this paper we report only the results 
relating to the overall ethnic group dummy variable. 
11    The value of the variable mother's education for minority students is very low, almost zero. 
12   In the short run, since achievement have an upper limit, the shift along the curve from left to right 
represents improvement, while on the long run, since knowledge is not limited, the shift of the curve represents a 
breakthrough in the current frontiers of knowledge. 
13    From a theoretical point of view, point B can also be considered to occur after the fourth decile of the 
student achievement distribution. This conclusion is based on Israeli data, where the first lower four deciles 
include minority and low SES groups and students who reside in the periphery – these groups account for 40 
percent of the population. Thus the turning point is between the fourth and fifth decile. Other countries will 
display different turning points, according to societal diversity, relating to the proportion of minorities, low SES 
groups and rural students in the total population.   
14    The regression with the interaction effect shows the mother’s education to have an effect, additional to 
the interaction effect, of 0.06** at the high school level (Table 3). 
15           Jewish students perform better than minority students, both at the middle-school level (t = 3.13**, df 
=366) and at the primary school level (using Scheffe tests for group mean differences in Mathematics, Science, 
and English, F (3,2122)=98.7**).   
16         Strictly speaking, our proposed needs-based formula weights should be raised by 25 percent (normalized 
to a 100), for comparison with the weights in the current formulas. 